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 This collection looks at the problems of emerging democracies and transition 
governments as they struggle to restore constitutional mechanisms for political 
participation and accountability.  The Philippine experience presents an excellent test case.  
On one hand, in 1986, it emerged from fourteen years of Marcos rule, determined to restore 
democracy and human rights, while addressing the welfare and redistributive welfare 
claims of a people mired in poverty.  Cory Aquino enshrined those aspirations in its 1987 
Constitution, creating explicit guarantees in its Bill of Rights and social justice clauses; 
institutionalizing check-and-balance mechanisms; constitutionalizing “People Power”, the 
peaceful but extra-legal exercise of the sovereign power.  That framework has been sorely 
tested over the years: by military coup attempts borne by impatience with the slowness of 
democratic decision-making; by politicians manipulating democracy itself and projecting 
their machinations as the people’s will; and, most recently, by “People Power” itself, as 
impatient multitudes demanded successfully the ouster of President Joseph (Erap) Estrada.  
These four essays look at the heroic struggle to translate democratic aspirations into 
workable frameworks, and the ironies of juridifying the political and freezing into formal 
institutions the free and ever flowing energies of a democratic people. 
 
 In the essay “Anointing Power with Piety”: People Power, Democracy and the Rule 
of Law, I examine the “classic tension between constitutionalism and the raw power of 
mass struggles”, using our experiences with “People Power” in ousting Marcos and 
restoring democracy, and in ousting Erap and testing our democratic institutions. 
 
 I begin with a brief survey of our constitutional history, and examine the dilemma 
of following the rules strictly vis-à-vis following the peoples’ will.  This dilemma was fully 
articulated in three episodes in our constitutional history, in which the democratic forces, 
significantly, took different positions.  In the case involving the ratification of the Marcos 
constitution in 1973, the Supreme Court applied the political test, i.e., whether the people 
had accepted the new constitution, rather than the legal text, i.e., whether they ratified that 
constitution in a proper plebiscite – and the democrats vehemently objected.  In the next 
episode, involving Cory Aquino’s interim and “revolutionary” Freedom Constitution, the 
political prevailed over the legal, but this time the democrats loudly applauded.  Next, when 
some politicians manipulated a bogus “people’s initiative” to lift term-limits and thus 
extend themselves in power, the Court applied a strict legal standard, to the delight of 
Filipino democratic forces. 
 
 The most recent, by no means final, episode is the ouster of President Erap through 
“People Power” protests, which showcases most starkly the Filipino constitutionalist’s 
dilemma.  On one hand, a sitting President can be ousted only through his voluntary 
resignation, or his conviction after an impeachment trial.  There was neither an express 
resignation nor a conviction in Erap’s case.  Yet widespread protests had made it 
impossible for him to govern, notwithstanding that his electoral mandate remained and that 
he continued to enjoy the support of a disorganized, largely inarticulate mass.  The essay 
discusses how the Philippine constitutional order balanced the competing claims between 
the rule of law and democratic governance. 
 
 In the essay Democratization of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
Departments of Government, Professor Carmelo V. Sison examines how the principle that 
the Philippines is “a democratic and republican state” is actualized through both direct 
democracy and through representative government. 
 
 He trances the history of the legislature as “a barometer and an enabler of 
democracy”, as antidote to the “despotic and unaccountable” governance.  In response to 
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the excesses of presidential power under Marcos, the 1987 Constitution has strengthened 
Congress, and enhanced its power over the public purse and its investigative powers. 
 
The Congress is made even more widely representative, by providing for the 
election of “party-list representatives”, who run not as as candidates of the traditional 
political parties, but are voted upon as representatives of marginalized sectors who 
otherwise remain under-represented in the ordinary electoral process, e.g., sectors such as 
labor, the peasantry, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women and the youth. 
 
Another set of reforms heightens the congressmen’s “fidelity to the public trust” 
and the fiduciary nature of their office.  They are required to declare their wealth, and 
disclose conflicts of interest arising from pending laws.  Their traditional power to dispense 
patronage through “pork barrel” is now constrained by accounting rules – the accounting 
books to be accessible to the public and to be audited by the independent Commission on 
Audit – to guard against abuse and the use of public moneys for private purposes.  Finally, 
the legislature, a representative body, is subjected to the people’s direct power of “initiative 
and referendum” to propose laws. 
 
 Professor Sison also examines the challenge of democratizing the executive branch, 
where power is in its essence reposed in “just one person, the President of the Philippines”, 
and who is alone is elected, everybody else in the executive branch theoretically acting 
solely on his behalf.  The president’s power encompasses the “awesome responsibility” and 
the “plenitude of authority” actually reposed in the executive’s power “to enforce and 
administer the laws.”  Having stated earlier that the 1987 Constitution was a response to 
executive excesses under Marcos, Professor Sison identifies the “structural limitations” 
placed on the president’s powers: first, the term-limit confiding him to a single six-year 
term; second, clearer rules on presidential succession, including disclosure of the 
incapacitating illness of the president; third, a ban on multiple positions by the President 
and his Cabinet; fourth, rules to preclude conflicts of interests, arising from outside 
professional, business or financial interests by the President and his Cabinet; fifth, an anti-
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nepotism rule which bans the President from appointing his relatives to powerful and 
lucrative offices; sixth, and most significantly, strict substantive and procedural constrains 
on the commander-in-chief clause and the President’s power to declare a state of 
emergency. 
 
 Finally, Professor Sison examines the place of judicial power in democratic 
governance.  He begins with the expanded scope of judicial power, i.e., to review just about 
any grave abuse of power by government, an obvious response to judicial timidity, if not 
complicity, during the Marcos years.  He also examines the structural mechanisms for 
judicial independence from the political branches of government.  The new Constitution 
provides for the courts’ fiscal autonomy from the Congress (which controls the purse) and 
the executive (which drafts the budget and disburses funds).  It further insulates the courts 
from partisan politics by vetting judicial appointments through an appointive Judicial and 
Bar Council, in place of congressional confirmation hearings. 
 
 
 In the essay The Revolution After EDSA: Issues of Reconstruction and People 
Empowerment, Professor Florin T. Hilbay builds upon this framework in “re-scaling [] the 
balance of power between the people and their representatives.”  In his conceptual 
framework, there are horizontal and vertical axes in structuring the mechanisms of political 
accountability.  Horizontally, the tripartite division of power among co-equal branches of 
government was restored, producing a weaker president and a strengthened judiciary.  
Vertically, however, democracy was institutionalized first, through clauses which allow the 
people to exercise political power more directly, and second, through a powerful 
Ombudsman – “champion of the citizen, eyes and ears of the people, super lawyer-for-free 
of the oppressed and the downtrodden” – side-by-side with an enhanced Code of Conduct 
for Public Officials, a law adopted by the first Congress after the fall of Marcos. 
 
 Professor Hilbay looks at the thorny problems arising from the “party-list” system 
of ensuring sectoral representation in Congress.  He looks at Supreme Court decisions 
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which define the proper ratio between the party-list representatives of marginalized sectors, 
on one hand, and the regular congressman elected by political majorities, on the other.  He 
also looks at another decision laying down the principle that the only bona fide party-list 
representatives are those who represent the marginalized and under-represented groups. 
 
 He further looks at how local governments have brought political power closer to 
the affected communities.  The Constitution has strengthened local autonomy, whereby 
state functions are devolved to local governments.  It further enables these constituencies to 
exercise the direct power to recall public officials, that is to say, to unseat the people they 
have elected. 
 
 
 In the essay Human Rights in the Philippines: Restoration, Recognition and 
Institutionalization, Professor Ibarra Gutierrez III examines how President Corazon Aquino 
harnessed both international and domestic law to ensure that the democratic gains of the 
newly restored democracy will endure.  Fresh from the human rights nightmare under the 
heavily militarized years under Marcos, Cory Aquino ratified key international treaties on 
human rights, as it were, a virtual insurance policy for liberty during that turbulent season 
when Aquino was under siege from periodic  coup attempts.  Aquino also called for the 
drafting of a new constitution to institutionalize democracy.  The result, the 1987 
Constitution, showcases what Professor Gutierrez calls “innovations” in democratic 
experimentalism.  It contained a strong Bill of Rights, protecting rights traditionally called 
“civil and political”, and a completely new article on “Social Justice and Human Rights”, 
protecting rights traditionally called “economic, social and economic.”  Finally, it created a 
new, independent Commission on Human Rights. 
 
 Professor Gutierrez discusses the strengths and weaknesses of such a Commission.  
He recognizes the creation of a national human rights commission as a “milestone” in 
human rights advocacy.  On the other hand, he also speaks of “the limits of hope”, as he 
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examines the Supreme Court decisions which have constricted the scope of the 
Commission’s work. 
 
 Finally, Professor Gutierrez discusses the “broader guarantees” for human dignity, 
which address the needs of the marginalized sectors, e.g., labor, farmers and the urban poor, 
which entail a legal framework for economic redistribution. 
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